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A substantial number of ﬁrms are run as a sole proprietorship or non-corporate ﬁrm. They
tend to be small and are typically characterized by concentrated ownership. A single
entrepreneur or only a few partners make the key decisions. Large ﬁrms, in contrast, are
almost exclusively organized as corporations and are subject to much tighter company
laws, accounting standards and book keeping regulations. For these reasons, large ﬁrms
tend to be more transparent and are more easily evaluated by external investors and
other stakeholders. Obviously, the tighter reporting requirements impose extra overhead
costs and make this legal form more expensive. The larger administrative costs should be
justiﬁed by economic beneﬁts of incorporation. Little is known about the precise nature
of these advantages. Economists mention limited liability and improved access to the
capital market as main advantages of incorporation. It is rather unclear, however, how
exactly the corporate form facilitates access to capital market ﬁnancing and how, if at all,
limited liability of the owners could promote the expansion of the ﬁrm. Our paper oﬀers
a theoretical explanation of the decision to incorporate. Further, we provide ﬁrm-level
evidence on the main predictions of the theory.
The public economics literature has empirically analyzed the impact of taxes on the
choice of organizational form [e.g. Gentry, 1994, Goolsbee, 2004, 1998, Gordon, 1998,
Gordon and MacKee-Mason, 1994, MacKee-Mason and Gordon, 1997, de Mooij and
Nicodème, 2008]. However, this literature typically assumes an exogenous distribution
across ﬁrms of the net beneﬁts or losses from incorporation. The focus is typically on
the use of the corporate form as a means to save taxes which leads to a larger rate of
incorporation in reduced form. By incorporating, entrepreneurs might be able to avoid
high personal income taxes under the sole proprietorship and instead become liable to
low corporate tax and personal dividend and capital gains taxes. This literature does
not provide a deeper structural explanation of the economic determinants of the choice
of organizational form. The law and economics literature has recently emphasized the
importance of legal rules such as degrees of investor protection, reporting requirements,
1bankruptcy rules etc. on economic performance.1 This literature is mainly empirical and
has not focussed on the choice of organizational form.
Our analysis rests on corporate ﬁnance theory as recently summarized in Tirole (2006).
This literature explains how the conﬂict of interest between entrepreneurs and managers,
protected by limited liability, and external investors bears on a ﬁrm’s ability to raise
external ﬁnancing. Part of the literature explicitely addresses the role of transparency
for corporate governance [see Hermalin and Weisbach, 2007, and Almazan, Suarez and
Titman, 2007 for two very recent contributions]. The choice of organizational form and its
economic determinants and consequences have not been analyzed, however. This paper
sets out to develop a theoretical framework of the main advantages and disadvantages
of incorporation. We then explain how ﬁrms self-select into organizational forms. The
analysis determines the decomposition of the business sector into corporate and non-
corporate form, and the relative size and other characteristics of these two types of ﬁrms.
The proposed theory formalizes two often cited advantages of incorporation: limited
liability and access to external capital. Adopting the corporate form requires to implement
tighter bookkeeping, accounting and reporting standards which imposes an extra overhead
cost that would not be necessary with a sole proprietorship or partnership. The advantage
of these standards is increased transparency to external investors and other stakeholders.
Therefore, the managerial discretion and autonomy of the entrepreneur is lower, the more
transparent and tighter the reporting requirements are. It becomes cheaper to incentivize
the entrepreneur. The ﬁrm’s pledgeable income that may credibly be promised as a
repayment to external investors, increases. The entrepreneur is thus able to raise more
external capital for any given amount of own equity. This formalizes the ‘access to capital
market’ argument which is often cited as an advantage of incorporation.
The other commonly stated advantage is limited liability. Typically, entrepreneurs
1See Armour and Cumming (2008), Berkowitz and White (2004), Crawford and Freedman (2007),
Djankow et al. (2002), Fan and White (2004), and La Porta et al. (1997, 1998, 2000). Spamann (2008)
and Martynova and Renneboog (2009) investigated the sensitivity of results in empirical law and ﬁnance
research. Bushman et al. (2004) provide an accounting perspective on corporate transparency.
2not only dispose of ﬁnancial assets that they inject as own equity in the ﬁrm, but are
also endowed with ‘private’ assets such as one’s own family house. Probably, the value
of private assets is higher for the entrepreneur than for the bank because they provide
an extra ‘consumer surplus’ such as living in one’s own house. We argue that banks can
seize all assets of sole proprietors including private assets. In contrast, depending on
bankruptcy rules, the corporate form protects a larger part of private assets on account
of limited liability. We emphasize two opposing consequences of limited liability. The
need to pledge all private assets sharpens incentives of sole proprietors and allows them
to raise more external ﬁnancing. However, entrepreneurs attach much higher value to
their private assets than banks or the market do. They might thus be very unwilling to
pledge the asset and to loose it in case of bankruptcy. The need to pledge private assets
emphasizes the downside risk of sole proprietorships. If entrepreneurs have a suﬃciently
high valuation of the private asset and are thus highly risk-averse, they might want to
protect it against the downside risk even if the asset could serve as collateral and raise
borrowing capacity. Hence, suﬃciently risk-averse entrepreneurs prefer to incorporate to
beneﬁt from limited liability and protect their private wealth. However, it might also be
the case that incorporated entrepreneurs voluntarily oﬀer their private asset as collateral
to facilitate external ﬁnancing if they are not very averse to the downside risk. Hence,
the value of limited liability is ambiguous.
To explore the central predictions of the theoretical model empirically, we compile
a cross-sectional data-set of more than 540,000 ﬁrms in manufacturing of 26 European
economies. These data on ﬁrm characteristics are merged with other country speciﬁc
data on taxes, entry and exit costs and corporate governance variables such as accounting
standards and measures of investor protection. The estimates of a variety of empirical
speciﬁcations of the incorporation decision are in line with the theoretical hypotheses.
Most importantly, a higher eﬀective corporate tax rate (comprising the corporate tax
rate plus personal income taxes at the shareholder level) reduces a ﬁrm’s probability to
incorporate while a higher personal income tax rate of the entrepreneur boosts incorpo-
ration. With respect to economic determinants, we ﬁnd that better accounting standards
3and better creditor rights which facilitate external ﬁnancing, lead to larger incorporation
rates. In contrast, costs of starting businesses which mostly relate to corporate ﬁrms
and their compliance with accounting and reporting regulations, signiﬁcantly reduce the
probability to incorporate. We also ﬁnd that costs of closing businesses, relating to the
downside risk of bankruptcy, have a signiﬁcantly positive impact on incorporation rates.
We conclude that limited liability is valuable in protecting private wealth which might be
more important than the beneﬁts of using private assets as a collateral to secure credit.
Finally, we ﬁnd that tax and economic determinants importantly interact. Firms that
are comparable in all other respects, become signiﬁcantly and substantially larger when
adopting the corporate form. In line with our theory, the (endogenous) incorporation
decision boosts ﬁrm size in terms of ﬁxed assets, but this impact is compressed (reduced)
by a higher eﬀective corporate tax burden.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The subsequent section presents a
stylized theoretical model of the decision to incorporate in the presence of taxes. Section
3 derives comparative static results for the key variables of interest. Section 4 introduces
the data-set, describes features of the data, presents the empirical model, and summarizes
the key empirical results. The last section concludes.
2 A Model of Incorporation
2.1 Tax Environment
The taxation of ﬁrms diﬀers by organizational form. An entrepreneur organizing as a
non-corporate ﬁrm or sole proprietorship is subject to personal income tax. Denote the
statutory rates by tw, as applied to labor earnings. Sole proprietors are usually taxed at
the same rate. It will be useful to use a separate symbol, tn = tw,w h e r en refers to non-
corporate ﬁrms. If incorporated, an entrepreneur pays corporate tax at rate τ but is also
liable to personal income taxes on distributed proﬁts. In constrast to directly progressive
4wage taxes, many countries tax dividends, interest and capital gains at separate, propor-
tional and often diﬀerent rates. Capital gains are usually tax preferred, either by reduced
rates or simply by the tax advantage of the realization principle. We summarize personal
level taxation of capital income by an eﬀective tax rate te. Most countries use methods to
avoid double taxation. This can be achieved by adopting a certain rate structure. Denote
by tc the total, eﬀective tax rate on corporate income paid by the shareholder. A few
countries still adhere to the classical system of full double taxation at the company and
personal level, leading to an eﬀective corporate tax rate of
tc = τ +( 1− τ)te. (1)
Double taxation is avoided if tc = tw. However, wage taxes are typically progressive so
that tax rates rise with income. In contrast, capital income taxes at the ﬁrm and personal
levels, τ and te, are often proportional. In this case, double taxation is much more diﬃcult
to avoid. Full integration with single taxation in all income brackets would require that
the corporate tax is considered a prepaid personal tax and is fully credited (and possibly
refunded) against the personal income tax. The personal tax liability would be te = tw−τ,
leading to an eﬀective rate equal to the rate on labor income, tc = te + τ = tw.W h e n
personal capital income is tax at proportional rates, double taxation may be avoided
on average only by appropriately setting tax rates in (1) but tc ≷ tw if tw is directly
progressive. Some countries apply a “half-rate method” or, more generally, include only
af r a c t i o nα of distributions as taxable personal income. This means that the eﬀective
rate on dividends etc. is te = αtw,l e a d i n gt oa ne ﬀective rate tc = τ +( 1− τ)αtw.T h e
subsequent analysis is based on the eﬀective rate tc which may exceed or fall short of the
personal income tax with progressive rates tw.
An additional problem in taxing corporate income arises when eﬀective tax rates on
labor and capital income diﬀer. Suppose capital income is taxed at a lower eﬀective
rate than labor income, tc <t w. Entrepreneurs can then save tax by incorporating
and collecting income in terms of lightly taxed dividends, instead of paying a heavily
5taxed manager’s salary for their managerial labor input.2 Income shifting by relabelling
entrepreneurial labor income as lightly taxed capital income can potentially lead to high
losses from income tax on wage earnings and artiﬁcially inﬂate revenues from corporate tax
and is often a substantial problem in countries with a dual income tax, see De Mooij and
Nicodème (2008), Sorensen (2005) and Fjaerli and Lund (2001) in a European context.
Sivadasan and Slemrod (2008) empirically documented signiﬁcant tax induced shifting
of income from proﬁts to managerial wages in India. The found that income shifting in
response to the tax law change of 1992 explains almost all of the observed increase in
measured wage inequality. Gordon and Slemrod (2000) have discussed this problem in
a more general context, pointing to other channels of income shifting between corporate
and personal tax bases, and found it to be empirically important for various periods
in the U.S. Cullen and Gordon (2007) point to a particular way of tax avoidance by
means of organizational choice. Entrepreneurs stay non-corporate when the company
makes losses and the income tax burden is low, either due to low tax rates in low income
brackets, or by oﬀ-setting business losses against other income. When the ﬁrm starts to
earn proﬁts, income tax liability rises progressively. Entrepreneurs then face a strong tax
incentive to incorporate in order to beneﬁt from a relatively lower eﬀective tax rate on
corporate income. Given our focus on other determinants of incorporation, we choose
to keep the model simple and do not explicitely address income shifting. In any case,
the additional tax advantage of incorporation due to income shifting should be captured
by the coeﬃcients of the tax rates in our econometric estimates of the probability to
incorporate.
2To capture income shifting, an earlier version of this paper assumed a true proﬁt contribution of the
entrepreneurial labor input equal to w,a d d i n gt oo t h e rp r o ﬁt ˜ π from investment. Given a total gross of
tax proﬁt w+˜ π, and claiming a management salary wt, the total tax liability is twwt+tc (w +˜ π − wt)=
tww + tc˜ π − (tw − tc)(w − wt). The ‘correct’ tax liability is tww + tc˜ π when the ‘true’ entrepreneurial
labor earnings are received as a management salary. Entrepreneurs can save tax (tw − tc)(w − wt) by
setting an artiﬁcially low salary wt, possibly equal to zero.
62.2 Entrepreneurial Finance
Entrepreneurship requires managerial eﬀort and is subject to bankruptcy risk. There
is a mass one of entrepreneurs who are endowed with ﬁnancial assets A and private
wealth H. The consumption value (1 + β)H of the private asset (one’s own family house)
exceeds market valuation H by external investors. If the private asset must be liquidated,
entrepreneurs suﬀer a deadweigth utility loss equal to βH.3 E n do fp e r i o du t i l i t yu =
y+βH+b consists of expected wealth y (income plus wealth endowment A+H,w h e r et h e
deposit rate is normalized to zero), consumer surplus βH from the private house (if not
liquidated), and the value of leisure b when shirking (‘private beneﬁts’). Supplying high
managerial eﬀo r tr e q u i r e st og i v eu pp r i v a t eb e n e ﬁts which reduces utility to u = y+βH.
After starting a ﬁrm, entrepreneurs must choose the organizational form. We abstract
from entry and assume that all entrepreneurs start a ﬁrm endowed with a single project
which is developed in two stages. The life-cycle of a ﬁrm consists of a start-up and an
expansion stage. Early stage investment k is ﬁxed and self-ﬁnanced out of own assets A,
expansion investment I is of variable size and is leveraged with external funds. Firms are
heterogeneous in their success probability q of the ﬁxed cost k and, thus, move with a
variable probability from start-up to expansion stage. This success probability is known to
ﬁrms at the beginning of period, and characterizes a ﬁrm’s type. The success probability
of expansion stage investment is either high or low, depending on managerial eﬀort, but
is otherwise symmetric across ﬁrms.
The timing of events is the following: (i) Given its type q,aﬁrm chooses organizational
form j ∈ {n,c},a n das p e c i ﬁc early stage investment kj is sunk;4 (ii) The ﬁrm either fails
(with probability 1−q) or continues with expansion investment; (iii) After self-ﬁnancing kj,
the owner is left with equity Ej ≡ A−kj <I j.T og oa h e a d ,b a n k sm u s tl e n dDj = Ij−Ej;
(iv) Expansion investment is sunk and the entrepreneur chooses eﬀort. High eﬀort (no
3We interpret the loss of consumer surplus in case of bankruptcy as down-side risk-aversion.
4Whether probability q is private information or not, does not matter. Since early stage investment
is fully self-ﬁnanced by assumption, there is no adverse selection problem in ﬁnancing start-ups.
7private beneﬁts) yields a high success probability p,l o we ﬀort (consumption of private
beneﬁts, or leisure) leads to pL <p ; (v) Given a rate of return ρ, investment yields end
of period value (1 + ρ)Ij if successful, and nothing if failed. If successful, the owner pays
back credit and consumes. As usual, the model is solved by backward induction.
Entrepreneurs ﬁnd it optimal to put up all their ﬁnancial assets A as own equity
to achieve maximum leverage. The corporate form oﬀers limited liability so that entre-
preneurs can protect their private assets. As a matter of choice, they can pledge their
private asset as a collateral hc for repayment equal to the market value in the bad state,
hc ∈ {0,H}. In contrast, sole proprietors are, by law, fully liable with all private wealth,
hn = H. Depending on choice and organizational form, banks can always get a repay-
ment of at least hj and can thus issue a riskless amount of debt equal to hj.S i n c e t h e
reﬁnancing cost equal to the deposit rate is normalized to zero, a competitive bank can
break even by charging no interest on safe debt. The zero proﬁt condition for safe debt
is phj +( 1− p)hj = hj. After getting safe debt, the ﬁrm still needs risky debt equal to
Dj = Ij −Ej −hj which can be repaid only in case of success while a failed ﬁrm is unable
to repay anything. Lending an amount Dj, the bank must thus charge a positive interest
on risky debt to break even, p(1 + i)Dj > Dj.
Taking account of the distinction between safe and risky debt, the company’s surplus
is divided between the owner and the bank according to5
π
e
j = p[(1 + ρ)Ij − Tj − (1 + i)Dj] − [1 + (1 − p)β]hj − Ej,
π
b
j = p(1 + i)Dj − (Ij − Ej − hj), (2)
πj =[ p(1 + ρ) − 1]Ij − pTj − (1 − p)βhj,
5Equivalently, πe
j = p[(1 + ρ)Ij − Tj − (1 + i)Dj − hj] − (1 − p)(1+β)hj − Ej. The owner repays
safe debt hj in the good state. Since a failed ﬁrm has no proﬁts, the owner looses the full consumption
value of her house in the bad state. Bank proﬁts are πb
j = p[(1 + i)Dj + hj]+( 1− p)hj − (Ij − Ej)
where the last term is total debt. Repayment in the good state is (1 + i)Dj on risky and hj on safe debt.
In the bad state, only hj is repaid upon liquidation of the collateral which leads to a deadweight loss of
βhj.N o t et h a tπe
j is the surplus over initial wealth. See Appendix A for the end of period utility.
8where Ej ≡ A − kj is own equity. Tax Tj = tj (ρIj − iDj) is due only if the company
succeeds, and depends on organizational form. If the venture succeeds, all debt is repaid.
Repayment of risky debt Dj = Ij −Ej −hj includes interest i, the loan rate on safe debt
is zero. If the company fails, the bank gets repayment only on safe debt hj by seizing the
owner’s private house with liquidation value hj. A competitive bank charges no interest on
safe debt since the deposit rate and, hence, the bank’s reﬁnancing cost are normalized to
zero. Liquidation of the private asset results in a deadweight loss βhj when the ﬁrm fails.
Adding tax to the last line yields a social surplus of π∗
j =[ p(1 + ρ) − 1]Ij − (1 − p)βhj.
Perfectly competitive banks can do no better than break even. A binding participation
constraint, πb
j =0 , leads to two consequences. First, given zero proﬁts in banking, the
owner appropriates the entire joint surplus, πe
j = πj,a sl o n ga ss h eo b t a i n se x t e r n a l
ﬁnancing. Second, the zero proﬁt condition requires a positive lending rate on risky debt,
p(1 + i)=1 ,ρ > i > 0. (3)
Assumption (A1) below means that entrepreneurs earn, per unit of investment, a non-
negative surplus p(1 + ρ) > 1, which implies ρ>iin (2).
2.3 Credit Analysis
External ﬁnancing are often subject to moral hazard and entrepreneurial opportunism.
Since eﬀort is costly, entrepreneurs might shirk and consume private beneﬁts if they gain
little extra income by supplying full eﬀort. The bank, on the other hand, can break even
only if high eﬀort is guaranteed and repayment is likely. For bank lending to be incentive
compatible, entrepreneurs must keep a high enough stake for high eﬀo r tt ob ew o r t h w h i l e
when eﬀort is costly in terms of foregone private beneﬁts bj = γjIj.P r i v a t eb e n e ﬁts are
assumed to rise linearly with the investment level. In raising the ﬁrm’s success probability
from pL to p,m o r ee ﬀort not only results in a higher expected end of period wealth but also
reduces the risk of loosing the consumer surplus βhj of the private asset. The incentive
constraint relating to (2) requires that the utility gain from a higher success probability
9must exceed the extra eﬀort cost,
(1 + ρ)Ij − Tj − (1 + i)Dj + βhj > γjIj/(p − pL) ≡ ΓjIj. (4)
Since eﬀort changes only the success probability, state independent terms do not enter
the incentive constraint.
The entrepreneur must keep a minimum amount Γj per unit of investment to guaran-
tee her eﬀort. However, the income share going to the owner limits the company’s debt
servicing capacity and, therefore, the size of a possible bank loan. Pledgeable income that
the ﬁrm can credibly promise for repayment of debt, is equal to the total project value
net of tax, (1 + ρ)Ij − Tj, minus the minimum incentive compatible income ΓjIj,b u ti s
augmented by βhj. The threat of loosing the consumer surplus from one’s own house
sharpens incentives, reduces the cost of incentivizing the entrepreneur, and thereby aug-
ments pledgeable income. Substituting tax liability Tj = tj (ρIj − iDj) and rearranging
shows the maximum incentive compatible debt level
Dj 6
£







The ﬁrm’s capacity to repay risky debt is exhausted by D
+
j . Since the entrepreneur’s
surplus in (2) increases linearly with investment Ij, she wants to borrow and invest as
much as possible until her borrowing capacity is exhausted. Substituting D
+
j into the
bank’s break even condition and noting (1 + i)p =1yields
Ij = mj ·
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Γj − (1 − tj)(ρ − i)




The ﬁrm invests more by leveraging equity Ej with outside funds Ij−Ej. Ignoring hj,t h e
inverse of the leverage factor mj would be the equity ratio Ej/Ij. Private assets may serve
as collateral, augmenting the borrowing capacity and allowing for higher investment.
We impose the following assumption:
p(1 + ρ) >p Γj >p(1 + ρ) − 1 > 0. (A1)
10The last inequality implies that, in the absence of tax, the owner’s surplus per unit of
investment is positive, see (2). The entrepreneur thus wants to invest as much as possible
which makes her borrow until she exhausts the ﬁrm’s borrowing capacity. In the absence
of tax, using p(1 + i)=1 , the leverage factor reduces to mj =1 /[pΓj − p(1 + ρ)+1 ]and
is positive by the second inequality. The ﬁrst inequality also implies p(1 + ρ − Γj) > 0
which implies that the multiplier mj =1 /[1 − p(1 + ρ − Γj)] is not only positive, but also
larger than one. Otherwise, the ﬁrm wouldn’t need outside ﬁnancing. The multiplier mj
thus indicates by how much own equity is leveraged with outside ﬁnancing. We assume
taxes to be small enough so that all properties also hold in the presence of tax.
The multiplier declines with higher private beneﬁts, i.e. with Γj = γj/(p − pL).M o r e
severe agency problems reduce credit and investment. A higher tax rate also reduces the











i +( ρ − i)mj
1+( 1− tj)i
< 0. (7)
I nt h el a s td e r i v a t i v e ,w eh a v eρ>ion account of (3). Both a higher eﬀective tax rate
and more severe agency problems reduce debt leverage and investment. The investment
reducing eﬀect results because the tax reduces cash-ﬂow and, thereby, the ﬁrm’s borrowing
capacity. This is entirely diﬀerent from standard neoclassical models where investment is
not ﬁnance constrained and, thus, not sensitive to cash-ﬂow.
Proposition 1 (Access to Capital) Tight reporting standards and book keeping rules
under corporate legal form make ﬁrms more transparent to external investors, reduce man-
agerial independence and agency costs (lower γj). The ﬁrm’s pledgeable income rises
which allows to raise more external capital for a given amount of own equity.
2.4 The Value of Limited Liability
With perfect competition among banks, the entrepreneur extracts the entire joint surplus
in (2). Since it linearly increases in Ij, investment is expanded as much as possible. Banks
11lend an amount of risky debt equal to Dj = Ij − Ej − hj (only this gives rise to interest
deductions since safe debt is available at zero interest). Upon substitution, tax liability
equals Tj = tj (ρ − i)Ij + tji(Ej + hj). Using this in (2) yields [again use p(1 + i)=1
when necessary]
πj =( 1− tj)(ρ − i)p · Ij − [tjip +( 1− p)β] · hj − tjpi · Ej.
Finally, substituting the constrained investment level Ij = mj ·
£
Ej +˜ ϕj · hj
¤
from (6)
gives a closed form solution for the entrepreneur’s surplus,
πj =[ ( 1 − tj)(ρ − i)mj − tji]p · Ej − ϕj · hj, (8)
ϕj ≡ (1 − p)β + tjip − (1 − tj)(ρ − i)pmj · ˜ ϕj,
where p(ρ − i)=p(1 + ρ)−1 > 0 is the gross of tax surplus per unit of investment. Own
equity Ej unambiguously raises the owner’s surplus when taxes are small.
The coeﬃcient ϕj is key to our analysis. A value ϕj > 0 means that pledging the
private asset diminishes the surplus πj. Entrepreneurs would not want to pledge their
own house, and they do not need to do so if protected by limited liability. A positive
net value can therefore be interpreted as people’s value of having their own house or
private asset protected by limited liability. By law, only the corporate form provides
this protection. However, the sign of ϕj is in general ambiguous, reﬂecting opposing
inﬂuences. The ﬁrst term parameterizes the deadweight loss from liquidating private
assets, i.e. the owner’s private value attached to her house exceeds market valuation by
af a c t o ro fβ. An entrepreneur looses highly valued private assets when the business fails
despite of high eﬀort. The utility loss from loosing one’s house can also be interpreted as
risk-aversion. The value of limited liability is in avoiding part of the downside risk of the
business. The second term reduces the surplus for tax reasons. When pledging her own
house, an entrepreneur can obtain a safe credit from a bank at a zero loan rate, instead
of risky debt with a loan rate i. Replacing risky debt thus reduces interest deductions in
case of success and inﬂates the tax bill by tiphj on average. The third term reﬂects the
collateral value of one’s house. By pledging private wealth, the entrepreneur can increase
12her borrowing capacity. She can invest an additional amount mj˜ ϕjhj because the risk of
loosing one’s house reduces the ﬁnancial incentives necessary to prevent shirking, thereby
augmenting the company’s pledgeable income and allowing banks to lend more. Each
unit of investment contributes an extra surplus net of tax equal to (1 − tj)(ρ − i)p.
By law, limited liability is granted only when adopting the corporated form which is
subject to tighter accounting standards. Limited liability is denied to non-corporate ﬁrms
with less transparent book keeping and reporting rules. We can now state the following
condition, in the absence of tax, for a positive value of limited liability,6
(1 − p)β/(1 + βp) >p(ρ − i)m(Γj) ⇒ ϕj > 0. (A2)
The condition is satisﬁed if (i) risk-aversion as measured by the above market valuation β
of the private asset, and (ii) agency costs as measured by Γj, become larger. The left hand
side increases with β and approaches a maximum value of (1 − p)/p for β →∞ .F o ra n y
given value of β, the multiplier on the right hand side declines when the moral hazard
problem becomes more severe (m0
j < 0). The condition is also assured if the cash-ﬂow
shrinks such that ρ → i which reduces the right hand side to zero.
Condition (A2) thus holds when entrepreneurial misbehavior is suﬃciently damaging
to business survival (large Γj and, thus, small mj). In the absence of limited liability, the
entrepreneur bears a larger downside risk which sharpens her incentives, raises pledgeable
income, relaxes the borrowing constraint and raises investment and expected income.
Assumption (A2) implies that the risk of loosing private assets in case of business failure
imposes a utility loss from foregone consumption value which exceeds the utility gain
from increased borrowing and investment. In other words, the safety net provided by
limited liability is worth more than the extra expected income from sharper incentives.
Hence, an entrepreneur opting for incorporation does not want to pledge private assets
a sac o l l a t e r a lt ob a n k sa n ds e t shc =0in order to maximize the surplus in (8). An
unincorporated entrepreneur, by law, is liable with her entire private wealth (hn = H
6With tax, the condition is
(1−p)β+tjip
1+β/[1+(1−tj)i] > (1 − tj)(ρ − i)pmj.
13always) and therefore suﬀers a utility loss. If condition (A2) is satisﬁed, limited liability
clearly favors incorporation. If the condition fails to hold, incorporated entrepreneurs
optimally set hc = H. They voluntarily use private assets as a collateral and prefer not
to take advantage of limited liability under corporate form. In this case, limited liability
is not relevant for the decision to incoporporate.7
Proposition 2 (Limited Liability) Limited liability is positively valued since it protects
against the loss of highly valued private assets, and negatively since the denial of private
assets as a collateral restricts access to external capital. Limited liability has a positive
net value and favors incorporation if (i) the above market valuation β of private assets is
large, and (ii) agency costs γj are large.
3 Law, Taxation and Incorporation
3.1 Costs and Beneﬁts of Incorporation
The cost of incorporation is that adopting the corporate form requires a larger start-up
investment which is self-ﬁnanced out of the entrepreneur’s own wealth, kc >k n =0 .F o r
simplicity, we normalize early stage investment of non-corporate ﬁr m st oz e r os ot h a t
kc = k is the diﬀerential cost of incorporation. These additional organiziational start-up
expenses reﬂect the extra costs created by the need to comply with the tighter book-
keeping and reporting standards which result in a higher degree of ﬁrm transparency and
investor protection. This additional expense also leads to an indirect cost. Since it is
self-ﬁnanced, it reduces own equity and investment leverage.
The main beneﬁt of incorporation is improved access to capital markets, i.e. external
ﬁnancing. Non-corporate ﬁrms are rather intransparent to external investors, giving large
7Condition (A2) thus formalizes the statement in Berkowitz and White (2004, p. 71): “In making
loans to small corporations, lenders therefore may require that owners personally guarantee the loans.
This abolishes the legal distinction between corporations and their owners for purposes of the particular
loan and puts the owner’s personal assets at risk to repay the loan.”
14autonomy and therefore large private beneﬁts to the entrepreneur. Corporate ﬁrms, in
contrast, must comply with tight accounting rules and are, thus, much more transparent
to external investors, allowing to raise more external ﬁnancing. Higher transparency
reduces the possible private beneﬁts from shirking when choosing the corporate form,
γc <γ n and, thus, Γc < Γn. With lower agency costs, it becomes cheaper to incentivize
entrepreneurs so that pledgeable income and borrowing capacity is increased. Firms can
raise more funds (multiplier mc >m n larger) and thereby achieve a larger leverage of own
equity. This is one aspect of ‘better access to external capital’ which is commonly viewed
as a major advantage of corporate compared to non-corporate form. For the same reason,
corporations are larger!
The law and ﬁnance literature emphasizes that better legal institutions and tighter
investor protection tend to reduce agency costs and facilitate investment, see the papers
b yL aP o r t ae ta l . ( 1 9 9 7e t c . ) ,o rA r m o u ra nd Cumming (2006, 2008). Other things
equal, better law towards more corporate transparency restricts managerial autonomy and
thereby reduces the possible beneﬁts from reaping private beneﬁts in conﬂict with interests
of outside investors. Within a country, the increased transparency under corporate legal
f o r ma l l o w se n t r e p r e n e u r st os e c u r em o r ec r e d i ta n dr a i s e st h el e v e r a g eo fo w ne q u i t y :t h e
diﬀerence in private beneﬁts γc <γ n induces a diﬀerence in multipliers as a measure of
leverage, mc >m n.
Another potential beneﬁt of incorporation is limited liability to protect some private
wealth in case of business failure. With limited liability, the owner does not need to
pledge private wealth and is protected against downside risk. Assumption (A2) implies
ϕc > 0 for corporate ﬁrms with low agency costs γc. In choosing the corporate form, an
entrepreneur does not need to and does not want to pledge private wealth. Hence, hc is
optimally set to zero in (8) which raises the owner’s surplus. A positive collateral would
only reduce expected surplus, despite of the fact, that it also helps to raise more funds. In
contrast, limited liability and downside protection is not available for sole proprietorships.
In this case, the owner has no choice, hn = H. By law, she is liable with her full private
15wealth which reduces her surplus by ϕnH where ϕn >ϕ c > 0.8 The advantage of limited
liability clearly favors incorporation. However, if the consumer surplus from private assets
is small, and agents are little averse to the downside risk of bankruptcy, then ϕj < 0.I n
consequence, entrepreneurs prefer not to make use of limited liability and voluntarily oﬀer
all private wealth as a collateral in order to raise more external ﬁnancing, independent
of organizational form. In fact, since ϕc <ϕ n < 0,o ﬀering collateral is more valuable to
corporate ﬁr m sw h i c ha r em o r et r a n s p a r e n ta n dc a nr a i s em o r ee x t e r n a lc a p i t a lt h a ns o l e
proprietorships. In this case, limited liability does not favor incorporation.
3.2 Incorporation Decision
Entrepreneurs are assumed to be heterogeneous with respect to the quality of their ﬁrm,
as measured by the project speciﬁc early stage success probability q0, which is distributed
in [0,1] with a cumulative distribution G(q)=
R q
0 g(q0)dq0.Aﬁrm with a project of type
q0 survives the start-up period with probability q0, and earns a zero return if it fails with
probability 1−q0. Establishing a corporation yields a net present value πcq0−k which varies
across ﬁrms with diﬀerent q0. The net present value of remaining a sole proprietor leaves
πnq0 instead. Maximizing end of period utility requires to choose the organizational form
which yields the higher net present value.9 Given the extra ﬁxed cost of incorporation,
the corporate form must yield a higher surplus to be attractive at all, πc >π n.A n
interesting interior solution requires some conditions on the relative magnitudes of these
terms which are discussed below. Under these assumptions, the cut-oﬀ value determining
business segmentation is given by the indiﬀerence condition q·πc−k = q·πn.T h ep i v o t a l
success probability is (see Figure 1 for illustration)
q = k/(πc − πn). (9)
It would be easy, although uninteresting, to ﬁnd parameters such that one or the other
organizational form does not exist in equilibrium. Our analysis focuses on parameters that
8Given Γc < Γn, (6) implies mc >m n.A s˜ ϕj is independent of Γj,( 8 )y i e l d sϕn >ϕ c.
9Comparing utilities is equivalent to comparing net present values, see (A.1) in the Appendix.
16support an interior equilibrium. For example, 1 >q>0 requires πc −πn >k .I n s p e c t i n g
(2) reveals that, in the absence of tax, corporate surplus is larger if Ic >I n. The inequality
πc >π n holds not only due to larger corporate investment but also because incorporation
oﬀers the valuable option of protecting one’s private wealth. If entrepreneurs are very
averse to bankruptcy, they want to keep their private asset safe and take advantage of
limited liability under corporate form. The value of a sole proprietorship, in contrast, is
reduced by the potential loss of private wealth in case of business failure (i.e. hc =0and
hn = H). The following assumption (in the absence of tax, T =0 ) indeed guarantees that
corporations invest more than non-corporate ﬁrms, even if they do not oﬀer collateral.
Without taxes, and using p(1 + i)=1 ,w eh a v e˜ ϕ ≡ 1+pβ and, therefore, Ic = mc [A − k]







The middle term necessarily exceeds unity. The inequalities are satisﬁed if the trans-
parency of corporations leads to a much larger multiplier than for sole proprietorships.
Making Γc small relative to Γn raises mc/mn while the middle term is close to unity if k
and H are small relative to A.
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Figure 1: Incorporation
17For further analysis, we write expected surplus in (8) separately for the two alternative
legal forms, after substituting in the optimal investment level,10
πc =[ ( 1 − tc)(ρ − i)mc − tci]p · (A − k), (10)
πn =[ ( 1 − tn)(ρ − i)mn − tni]p · A − ϕn · H.
3.3 Tax Eﬀects
We consider ﬁrst a higher corporate tax which, for given taxes at the personal level,
inﬂates the eﬀective tax tc on corporate proﬁts, and so do higher dividend taxes at the
personal level. When ϕj > 0, entrepreneurs want to beneﬁt from limited liability. When
incorporating, they choose to protect private assets and deny collateral by optimally
setting hc =0 . There is thus no tax eﬀect on the value of collateral. A corporation’s NPV
will importantly hinge on the level of expansion investment Ic = mc (A − k). By reducing
available cash-ﬂow for repayment of external debt, the tax erodes the ﬁrm’s borrowing
capacity and reduces the leverage ratio mc in (7) and thereby constrains investment. With
ab i n d i n gﬁnance constraint, a reduction in investment has a strictly negative ﬁrst order









p(A − k) < 0. (11)
The ﬁrst two terms in the square bracket express the direct reduction in ﬁrm value due
to higher tax payments. The third is the negative behavioral eﬀect via investment. The
reduction in corporate value obviously discriminates against incorporation. This could be
illustrated in Figure 1 by the downward rotation of the q0πc − k line.
Proposition 3 (Eﬀective Corporate Tax Rate) Ah i g h e re ﬀective tax rate on corpo-
rate proﬁts reduces borrowing, investment and ﬁrm value of corporations and reduces the
10We focus on ϕj > 0 below, i.e. limited liability is valuable. In the absence of tax, πc =( ρ − i)pIc >
πn =( ρ − i)pIn −ϕnH.I nt h ec a s eϕc <ϕ n < 0, both types of ﬁrms voluntarily oﬀer collateral, leading
to πc =( ρ − i)pIc − ϕcH>0. Corporations leverage investment even more relative to non-corporates
and also derive a larger gain from oﬀering collateral so that πc >π n holds a fortiori.
18probability to incorporate.
In many countries, income of sole proprietors is subject to the standard progressive
income tax. Due to double tax relief or a separate lower tax on interest, dividends
and capital gains, personal capital income is often taxed at a much lower rate. A higher
personal income tax will thus have only a limited impact on the eﬀective corporate income
tax. We thus consider an increase in the personal income tax, holding the eﬀective tax
tc on corporate income constant. This scenario thus aﬀects investment and proﬁts in a
way parallel to the paragraph above. The only diﬀerence stems from the fact the owner
of a non-corporate ﬁrm cannot protect her private wealth. By (6), the collateral value of
the private asset rises with the tax rate, d˜ ϕn/dtn = βi/[1 + (1 − tn)i]
2 > 0,w h i c hb o o s t s
investment and partly oﬀsets the other detrimental tax eﬀects. The reason is seen from the
incentive constraint (4-5). An entrepreneur who must pledge privately valued assets, has
more at stake if the business fails. The collateral value of H sharpens incentives and allows
for a larger incentive compatible debt level. Due to the tax savings from the additional
interest deductions, the private asset expands debt capacity by βH/[1 + (1 − tn)i] in (5).
The value of the tax deduction increases with the tax rate. The collateral value of the
private asset for this reason expands debt capacity and investment to a larger extent when
the tax rate is higher, leading to d˜ ϕn/dtn > 0. The tax saving arising from the collateral
value of the private asset thus reduces somewhat the other detrimental eﬀects of the tax
rate on investment.
The personal income tax also reduces the NPV of non-corporate ﬁrms. The only
diﬀerence to (11) again derives from the tax implications of the collateral value of H.
Taking the deriviative of (8) yields
dϕn
dtn










The square bracket is negative, making the overall eﬀect positive.11 A higher personal tax
rate reduces the net present value of non-corporate ﬁrms qualitatively in the same way
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19as in (11) referring to corporations. However, the inability of entrepreneurs to protect
their private assets reduces the value of non-corporate ﬁrms by the term ϕn in (10), and
t h en e g a t i v ev a l u a t i o ne ﬀect is even stronger when the tax rate increases (dϕn/dtn > 0
reduces πn even more than in 11). For this additional reason, the personal income tax
should create a strong reason to incorporate. In Figure 1, the qπn-line tilts down, reduces
the pivotal q and increases the probability to incorporate.
Proposition 4 (Personal Income Tax) The personal income tax reduces borrowing,
investment and net present value of non-corporate ﬁrms and thereby increases the proba-
bility to incorporate.
3.4 Institutional Determinants
Our framework points to a number of institutional determinants that should aﬀect the in-
corporation decision and which enter our econometric analysis as independent control vari-
ables. The theory is importantly driven by the trade-oﬀ between increased transparency
for outside investors and the better access to external ﬁnancing under the corporate form,
and the extra costs of complying with tighter accounting and reporting standards. The
‘access to external capital’ argument should also be particularly important for ﬁrms with
a high return to investment and, therefore, a high growth potential. On the other hand,
the ‘limited liability’ argument for incorporation seems less important since limited liabil-
ity seems to be a bane and a boon at the same time. Short of providing rigorous proofs,
we now state the following conjectures:
( i )W ec o n j e c t u r et h a tt h eq u a l i t yo fac o u n t r y ’ sc o m m e r c i a ll a w( a c c o u n t i n ga n d
reporting rules, degrees of investor protection, corporate governance and transparency
standards etc.) reduce the discretion for managerial misbehavior in the corporate organi-
zation (γc falls relative to γn). Control variables capturing aspects of accounting standards
and corporate governance should thus raise corporations’ borrowing capacity and thereby
increase size and value of corporate ﬁrms relative to sole proprietorships. The same should
20be true for creditor rights which facilitate the oversight by external investors (relationship
banking), allowing to commit more funds when they can gain control over ﬁrms in ﬁnan-
cial distress and force repayment more easily. The probability of incorporation should
thus increase in measures of accounting standards and creditor rights.
(ii) Firms face various set-up costs. Since corporate ﬁrms must comply to tighter
commercial and legal regulations and reporting standards, the costs of creating a corporate
ﬁrm are larger. In fact, we conclude that many standard empirical measures of entry costs
such as days necessary to start a business, registering costs, costs of starting a business etc.
mainly apply to corporations rather than non-corporate ﬁrms (increasing k). In Figure
1 ,t h ec o r p o r a t ev a l u el i n es h i f t sd o w na n dr a i s e st h ep i v o t a lq. We thus conjecture that
these variables should reduce the probability of incorporation.
(iii) Our formal analysis revealed that limited liability does not unambiguously favor
corporate ﬁrms. On the one hand, protecting one’s private wealth is valuable for an
entrepreneur and thus favors the corporate form. On the other hand, the threat of loosing
one’s private wealth also sharpens incentives and raises the borrowing capacity. This
reduces the value of limited liability and would speak against incorporation. We thus
conclude that measures such as costs of closing business or tightness of bankruptcy rules
should have no clearcut eﬀect on the incorporation decision.
(iv) Finally, we ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant and consistently negative impact of
antidirector rights. This variable measures the control of and inﬂuence on directors or
managers of the ﬁrm by outside shareholders. In the extreme case, outside investors
such as venture capitalists could easily replace the founding entrepreneur as it frequently
happens in venture capital ﬁnancing (see Hellmann and Puri, 2002, for evidence from
Silicon Valley). Black and Gilson (1998) argue that entrepreneurs are rather averse to
giving up independence and autonomy and are willing to accept venture capital only
because of its time-limited nature. Although outside our theoretical model, we believe that
tight antidirector rights might render the corporate form unattractive as they interfere
with the entrepreneurs’ desire for independence and personal autonomy.
214 Empirical Analysis
In the empirical part, we use a large data-set of 544,291 ﬁrms which are located in Europe
and whose major business activity is in manufacturing. The data-set is made available
by Bureau van Dijk through the large edition of Amadeus (Update 146, published in
November 2006). While the original source comprises a panel data-set, the strength of
Amadeus lies in the cross-section rather than the time series.12 To avoid the inﬂuence
of particular years and the loss of cross-sectional information due to missing time-series
data, we compute averages of the data between 1999 and 2004 throughout.
We link the data-set with four other sources of data available at the country level:
i n f o r m a t i o no nt h ee ﬀective shareholder corporate tax burden (including local taxes on
proﬁts and dividends) is taken from KPMG’s Corporate Tax Rate Survey 1993-2006,13
personal income tax rates and wages in manufacturing are collected by Egger and Rad-
ulescu (2008).14 Institutional determinants of the incorporation decision are collected by
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1999) and available from the World
Bank’s Doing Business 2003-2007.
From the database of La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1999), we
use three variables which are related to transparency of reporting and monitoring costs,
12There is substantial attrition in the panel and, even more importantly, time-series data-points are
frequently inter- or extrapolated by collecting authorities. The latter renders the exploitation of the
time-series dimension in the data over the available short period after 1999 almost useless.
13To calculate this tax burden, we assume that a typical shareholder is subject to the corporate
income tax and — if proﬁts are paid out as dividends — to an additional personal income tax. Thereby,
we account for integration schemes between corporate and personal income taxes. For instance, for a
statutory corporate tax rate of 30 percent and a withholding tax on dividends of 20 percent, we obtain
an eﬀective shareholder tax burden of 44 percent in the case of a classical system, see (1).
14The original sources of the data are the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development,
PriceWaterhouseCoopers, and the International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation, described in detail in
Egger and Radulescu (2008). We use the top personal income tax rate expressed as a fraction of unity.
Hence, a top personal income tax rate of average wages of 0.5 indicates a tax rate of 50 percent in the
highest income bracket.
22namely indices capturing creditor rights, accounting standards and anti-director rights
(i.e., shareholder protection rules). Thes are discussed in paragraphs (i) and (iv) of
section 3.4. In the context of our model these costs reﬂect an average ﬁrm’s access
to external ﬁnancing. From the World Bank’s Doing Business data-set, we use indices
capturing the costs of starting and closing a business. In the context of our model, these
reﬂect the ﬁxed costs of setting up a ﬁrm and exit costs (see paragraphs (ii-iii) in Section
3.4).15 According to the theoretical model, we expect to ﬁnd a positive impact of better
accounting standards and creditor rights on the probability to incorporate, and a negative
impact of antidirector rights. Higher entry costs should reduce incorporation while we
have no clear-cut prediction on the value of limited liability and, thus, on the impact of
higher exit costs.
4.1 Data and Econometric Speciﬁcation
Of the 544,291 manufacturing ﬁr m si n c l u d e di no u rs a m p l e ,a b o u t93 percent are incor-
porated and the rest is unincorporated. The large fraction of incorporated ﬁr m si sn o t
due to a selection of mainly large ﬁrms in our sample: about 10 percent of the included
ﬁrms have only one employee, average ﬁrm size is about 65 employees (the median ﬁrm
h a sl e s st h a n9 employees), and ﬁrms in the inter-quartile range have between 3 and 26
employees. About 10 percent of the included ﬁrms have been incorporated between 1999
and 2004. The average incorporated ﬁrm is about 17 years old, and the median is 13
years old. The inter-quartile range of ﬁrm age covers units which are between 7 and 20
years old. The ﬁrms are located in one of the 26 European economies listed in Table A1
of the Appendix. The representation of the ﬁrm population varies across countries due to
the coverage in Amadeus. Countries which are particularly well represented are Belgium,
Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and most of the Central
15These variables refer to the average time to complete all necessary procedures to start up and operate
a business, the cost of bankruptcy proceedings, and the recovery rate informing about how many cents
on the dollar claimants (creditors, tax authorities, and employees) recover from an insolvent ﬁrm.
23and Eastern European economies.
Other features of the data are found in Table A2 of the Appendix. The Table reports
observation numbers for the explanatory variables together with the mean and standard
deviation of each covariate used in the subsequent regressions.16 The descriptive statistics
for the eﬀective shareholder corporate tax burden and personal income tax variables are
most notable. For instance, the eﬀective shareholder corporate tax and the top personal
income tax rate on average wages tend to be lower in countries, where incorporated ﬁrms
are located in, than in other countries, on average. However, we should be careful with
drawing ﬁrm conclusions from Table A2 for two reasons. First, the tax variables are
signiﬁcantly correlated with each other so that Table A2 is not telling about the partial
impact of the tax instruments on the probability of incorporation at the ﬁrm level.17
This can be done by means of a multivariate model. Second, incorporation is captured
by a binary indicator variable which — according to Sections 2 and 3 — is the observable
counterpart to the unobservable (latent) proﬁt comparison undertaken by entrepreneurs
in advance of the incorporation decision. Inference on the impact of any of the tax
instruments on the incorporation decision should account for the non-linear relationship
between the tax instruments and the indicator variable. The latter can be done in a





= tcβ1 + tnβ2 + Zciδ + εf, ∀f =1 ,...,N
where f, c,a n di are ﬁrm, country, and industry speciﬁc indices, respectively. y∗
f denotes
16Not all the regressors are available for all 26 countries in the sample which explains the diﬀerences
in observations both across the covariates in Table A2 and across the estimated models below.
17The correlation coeﬃcient between the eﬀective shareholder corporate tax burden and the top per-
sonal income tax rate on average wages amounts to 0.721. Moreover, the personal income tax rate at
average wages in manufacturing is correlated with the top personal income tax rate between the aver-
age and ﬁve times the average wage with a coeﬃcient of −0.297. All of the mentioned coeﬃcients are
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at one percent.
24the unobserved variable (i.e., the proﬁtability of incorporation), and yf is the observed
binary variable of the legal status of the ﬁrm (where entry one stands for an incorporated
ﬁrm with y∗
f > 0). tc and tn indicate the country-speciﬁce ﬀective shareholder corporate
tax burden and the top personal income tax rate. Zci is an N ×K matrix of country and
industry speciﬁc controls (including a constant or country speciﬁce ﬀects at the NACE
3-digit level). Finally, εf is the remainder error term. β1, β2, β3,a n dt h eK ×1 vector δ
are unknown and need to be estimated.
4.2 Empirical Results
I nT a b l e1 ,w es u m m a r i z et h eﬁndings from parsimonious and less parsimonious models
where the ﬁrm-level decision to incorporate is a function of the two tax instruments of
interest (corporate and top personal income tax rates), a constant or ﬁxed NACE 3-
digit industry eﬀects, and a number of control variables. In Probit1, we assume that the
coeﬃcients across all NACE 3-digit industries are identical. Alternatively, we allow for
industry-speciﬁce ﬀects and include a complete set of 127 NACE 3-digit industry dummies
in Probit2. All regressions in Table 1 are non-linear probability models, assuming that the
latent variable (i.e., the net beneﬁt from incorporation to the ﬁrm) is normally distributed
(see Cameron and Trivedi, 2005; Greene, 2008).
The following conclusions can be drawn from the results in the table. In general,
the explanatory power of the tax variables alone is remarkable.18 McFadden’s pseudo-
R2 in Probit 1 amounts to about 14 percent, which is due to the tax variables and the
constant only. A higher corporate proﬁt tax rate reduces, and a higher top marginal
income tax rate raises the probability to incorporate. The theoretical model suggests
that the entrepreneur-manager is less likely to incorporate when the eﬀective shareholder
corporate tax burden is high. On the other hand, higher personal income tax rates — i.e.,
higher costs of staying unincorporated — should raise the probability of incorporation.
18The standard errors are robust to clustering at the country level and to heteroskedasticity of arbitrary
form throughout the paper.
25The empirical results are supportive of these hypotheses.
The inclusion of the 127 NACE 3-digit dummies in Probit 2 does not improve the
pseudo-R2 of the model a lot.19 The latter may be a ﬁrst indication of the relative impor-
tance of country-level variables as opposed to industry-level variables for the incorporation
decision at the ﬁrm level. However, the joint impact of the industry dummies is signif-
icantly diﬀerent from zero so that we include them always in the subsequent empirical
models. Notice that the parameter estimates of the two tax instruments included in Probit
2 are very close to the ones in Probit 1 with excluded industry dummy variables.
Table 1
Other important drivers of the decision to incorporate are (institutional) variables
related to the ﬁxed costs of incorporating as well as entering and exiting the market.
Such variables are collected in La Porta, Lopez-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1999), and
the World Bank’s Doing Business Data described above. Probit 3 and Probit 4 in Table
1s u m m a r i z et h eﬁndings from less parsimonious speciﬁcations than Probit 1 or 2. The
institutional variables, however, are not available for all countries in the sample. We must
thus rely on a somewhat smaller number of observations. Yet, in Probits 3 and 4, the
number of included ﬁrms still exceeds 360,000.
The institutional variables in Probit 3 include creditor rights, accounting standards,
and anti-director rights as well as log GDP per capita (the latter being a measure of wage
costs).20 These institutional covariates are relatively important: the pseudo-R2 in Probit
3i sa b o u t12 percentage points higher than its counterpart in Probit 2. Based on our
19However, the industry dummies have a nontrivial explanatory power which becomes evident from
the amount of perfect predictions due to these dummies alone: while the parameter estimates in Probit
1 relied upon 544,291 observations, the ones in Probit 2 only use 521,286. The diﬀerence is simply the
number of perfect predictions due to the inclusion of the industry dummies.
20In an earlier version of the paper, we used average wage costs per employee (including social security
contributions) in a country’s manufacturing sector, and the results turned out similar to the ones we
obtain with GDP per capita. However, we prefer the current speciﬁcation, since it avoids a further
loss of observations due to missing wage data. Using wages per employee at the ﬁrm level is not an
26theoretical model, we have argued in section 3.4, paragraph (i), that better accounting
standards as well as creditor rights should boost the probability to incorporate, and we
have concluded in paragraph (iv) that anti-director rights might discourage incorporation.
The empirical results of Probit 3 support these hypotheses. When associating a higher
level of per-capita GDP with higher wage expectations, it is consistent with our model
that an increase in wage expectations reduces the probability to incorporate.
Probit 4 includes two additional control variables from the World Bank’s Doing Busi-
ness Data: the costs of closing business and the costs of starting business. We tend to
associate the costs of starting businesses as mainly being relevant for corporate ﬁrms and
therefore reﬂecting ﬁxed costs of incorporation. We ﬁnd, in line with our theoretical re-
sults, that higher starting costs deter incorporation. Further, the coeﬃcient in Probit 4
shows that higher exit costs raise the probability of incorporating. Associating exit costs
with the tightness of bankruptcy rules, one might think of this as putting some discipline
on entrepreneurs, thereby reducing agency costs and facilitating external ﬁnancing. This
beneﬁt is potentially oﬀset by the risk of loosing highly valued private assets so that the-
ory provides no clear prediction. We ﬁnd a signiﬁcantly positive impact of higher costs of
closing business, possibly indicating that the disciplining role of bankruptcy procedures
favors incorporation. However, while the exit and entry cost variables enter signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero, they are not as important as the corporate governance variables when
it comes to their marginal explanatory power (the pseudo-R2 was 0.271 in Probit 3 and
it is 0.274 in Probit 4).
Altogether, the results in Probits 3 and 4 indicate that the two pillars of our theoretical
model — corporate and personal income tax rates as well as accounting and governance
standards together with ﬁxed costs of incorporation, as captured by entry cost — are
important to explain the variation of the incorporation indicator variable. The relative
option here and would induce an endogeneity problem: individuals decide upon incorporation ex ante,
i.e., before realizing proﬁts or wages; moreover, the ﬁrm-level data-set does not allow discerning wages of
managers from those of workers. Similarly, the inclusion of other ﬁrm-level variables such as the number
of employees is not advisable because of a possible endogeneity problem.
27magnitude of the coeﬃcients on corporate proﬁt and personal income tax rates are lower in
Probits 3 and 4 than in Probits 1 and 2. The reason for the latter is mainly the correlation
between tax rates and per-capita GDP (0.868 and 0.778, respectively). However, while the
impact of the considered tax instruments on the probability to incorporate is somewhat
smaller in Probits 3 and 4 than in their more parsimonious counterparts, the qualitative
insights remain unaﬀected by considering a larger number of country-level covariates.
To get a sense of the relative importance of the tax variables for the incorporation
decision, we compute the marginal eﬀects and their standard errors for Probit 4. We may
evaluate these eﬀects at the sample mean as well as the sub-sample means of incorporated
and unincorporated ﬁrms. We ﬁnd that a one-percentage-point increase in the eﬀective
shareholder corporate tax burden results in a decline of the probability to incorporate
of about 0.1 percentage points for the average ﬁrm. The response probability for the
incorporated ﬁrms reacts in the same way, while that of the unincorporated ﬁrms declines
by almost 0.3 percentage points. All of the estimated marginal eﬀects are signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero at one percent. Given that the standard deviation of the eﬀective
shareholder corporate tax burden is almost 14 percentage points in the sample, a band of
±1 standard deviation of the tax burden implies a band of percentage point changes in
the response probability of about ±1.4 percentage points on average.
4.3 Sensitivity Analysis
We regard Probit 4 as our preferred empirical model of ﬁrm-level incorporation choice
and assess the sensitivity of results along three diﬀerent lines: the inclusion of industry-
by-country average capital intensity measured by the log ratio of cash ﬂow to ﬁxed assets
as an additional covariate;21 the use of alternative governance variables (creditor rights;
accounting standards; and anti-director rights) from Martynova and Renneboog (2009)
instead of the ones from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1999), the
21We conjecture that ﬁrms with a larger cash-ﬂow ratio are more proﬁtable, invest more and, thus,
beneﬁt more from incorporation to facilitate external ﬁnancing.
28functional form of the non-linear probability model, and the exclusion of large ﬁrms. For
t h es a k eo fb r e v i t y ,w ef o c u so nt h ep a r a m e t e r so ft h et a xv a r i a b l e s—t h ec o r p o r a t ep r o ﬁt
and top personal income tax rates — to discuss the results of the sensitivity analysis in
Table 2. For convenience, we repeat the benchmark results of Probit 4 in the ﬁrst column.
Table 2
The ﬁndings from our sensitivity analysis may be summarized as follows. First, the
coeﬃcient of average cash ﬂow over ﬁxed assets in manufacturing of a country in Probit 5
(referred to as Alternative 1 in the table) is positive and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero
at conventional levels. The model predicts that a higher capital intensity of an industry
in a country leads to a larger number of incorporated ﬁrms there. However, adding this
variable to the list of covariates has little bearing for the other parameter estimates.
Second, the construction of the variables reﬂecting creditor rights, accounting stan-
dards, and anti-director rights by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1999)
has been criticized recently. It turns out that some of their original ﬁndings are sensitive
to the use of more accurate indices than theirs in replication studies. In Probit 6 (referred
to as Alternative 2 in Table 2), we use an alternative set of indices for the same gov-
ernance measures which has been made available by Martynova and Renneboog (2009).
It turns out that the explanatory power is slightly better with these variables than with
t h eo n e si nP r o b i t4( w i t hap s e u d o - R 2 of 0.274 in Probit 4 and one of 0.275 in Probit
6). However, there is no qualitative diﬀerence between the two models in the sense that
the signs of the coeﬃcients remain unaﬀected and they remain signiﬁcant at conventional
levels. One exception is the coeﬃcient of the costs of starting business, which is more
collinear with the variables from Martynova and Renneboog (2009) than with the ones
of La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1999) and not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero in Probit 6.
Third, we estimate the speciﬁcation by logit instead of probit (Alternative 3 in Table
2). The logit model displays a somewhat higher value for McFadden’s pseudo-R2 than
29probit and would be preferable to probit (see Davidson and MacKinnon, 2004, for a
likelihood-based test on probit versus logit). However, there is no qualitative diﬀerence
between the results in Probit 4 and the logit model in terms of the coeﬃcient signs. All
of the coeﬃcients of the variables of interest in the logit model are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
at conventional levels.
Finally, we run Probit 4 on sub-samples which exclude ﬁrms with more than 200
employees (Alternative 4) or more than 100 employees (Alternative 5), respectively. We
ﬁnd that the results display only little sensitivity to those restrictions which is remarkable:
the number of observations drops from 362,224 in Probit 4 to 99,977 in Alternative 4 and
to 91,901 in Alternative 5. Even though we mentioned before that our sample mainly
consists of ﬁrms in the relevant size range, we feel more comfortable with the results
being insensitive to the exclusion of large to medium-sized enterprises.
4.4 Extension
We have focused on the determinants of the incorporation decision. A possible extension
of the empirical exercise guided by our theoretical model is to consider the consequences
of incorporation and its interaction with the eﬀective shareholder corporate tax burden
for ﬁrm size. One goal of our research was to model the incorporation decision as a
choice. This suggests that an indicator variable of incorporation should not be treated
as exogenous in empirical work on the impact of incorporation on ﬁrm size. We may
account for endogenous ﬁrm selection into incorporation by means of matching based
on the propensity score (i.e., the estimated response probability as in Tables 1 and 2).
Assuming that the determinants of incorporation are observable and captured by a model
such as Probit 4, that incorporation choice apart from the included observables is random,
and that selection into incorporation of a ﬁrm does not aﬀect other ﬁrms’ decisions, we
may estimate the impact of endogenous incorporation on ﬁrm size consistently.
We use the estimated response probabilities of Probit 4 to determine suitable control
units — unincorporated ﬁrms with the same probability to incorporate as the actually
30incorporated ones — and estimate the average treatment eﬀect of incorporated ﬁrms as the
average diﬀerence in ﬁrm size between the incorporated and the suitable control ﬁrms.22
The theoretical model suggests that incorporated ﬁrms are larger than unincorporated
ones after controlling for self-selection. Furthermore, the model suggests that a higher
eﬀective shareholder corporate tax burden compresses (reduces) this positive main eﬀect
of incorporation on ﬁrm size. The latter can be inferred by including an interactive term
between the incorporation indicator variable and the eﬀective shareholder corporate tax
burden in the conditional mean regression model after matching (see Blundell and Costa
Dias, 2002). Following the theoretical model, we use log ﬁxed assets at the ﬁrm level as a
measure of ﬁrm size and report the results from exogenous and endogenous incorporation
eﬀect estimates in Table 3.
Table 3
The results in Table 3 suggest the following conclusions. First, taking account of en-
dogenous selection matters. The treatment eﬀect of incorporation on the actually incor-
porated ﬁrms is negative without conditioning on the observables and positive otherwise.
Let us refer to the corresponding estimate as the exogenous treatment eﬀect and the one
obtained with matching as the endogenous treatment eﬀect. Both the exogenous and
endogenous treatment eﬀects are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at one percent when
applying conventional levels of statistical signiﬁcance. Note that incorporation would
actually reduce ﬁrm size if the estimate of the exogenous average treatment eﬀect of
22We apply matching based on the propensity score with common support which works as follows.
First, estimate the propensity of incorporation by means of a nonlinear probability model. Second, exclude
all incorporated ﬁrms for which the propensity of incorporation is larger than the maximum propensity
of incorporation in the group of unincorporated ﬁrms. Similarly, exclude all those unincorporated ﬁrms
whose estimated propensity to incorporate is smaller than the minimum propensity to incorporate of the
group of incorporated ﬁrms. What we are left with is referred to as the common support region. Third,
use the estimated propensity scores within the common support region to ﬁnd closest-possible matches
for each incorporated ﬁrm in the group of unincorporated ﬁrms. Fourth, calculate the average diﬀerence
in the outcome (in our case, ﬁrm size) between the incorporated and the matched unincorporated ﬁrms.
This diﬀerence is referred to as the average treatment eﬀect (of incorporation) of the treated on outcome.
31incorporation in the ﬁrst column of Table 3 were taken. However, the estimate of the
endogenous average treatment eﬀect of the incorporated ﬁrms in column three of the Ta-
ble is clearly positive. The point estimate suggests that incorporation causes ﬁrm size to
increase by about 100 · exp(0.408 − 1) ' 55%.
Second, our theory suggests that a higher eﬀective shareholder corporate tax alters
the impact of incorporation on ﬁrms size. An impact on ﬁrm size is found for the (in-
consistent) exogenous treatment eﬀect as well as the endogenous treatment eﬀect. In line
with the hypotheses from our theoretical model, a higher eﬀective shareholder corporate
tax compresses the positive treatment eﬀect of incorporation on ﬁrm size, but only af-
ter accounting for endogenous selection into incorporation (see the last column of Table
3). The interactive eﬀect of incorporation and the eﬀective corporate tax burden is sig-
niﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at one percent at conventional levels. The results in the
last column of Table 3 imply that the eﬀective shareholder corporate tax burden which
renders the average treatment eﬀect of incorporation of the incorporated ﬁrms consistent
with the estimate in the third column, amounts to about 52.13%. This rate is higher
than the average tax rate among all incorporated ﬁr m sr e p o r t e di nt h eﬁrst row of Table
A2. This has to do with the exclusion of observations outside the common support region
of propensity scores.23 According to the parameter estimates in the last column of the
table, an increase of the eﬀective shareholder corporate tax burden by one percentage
p o i n tf r o mt h a ta v e r a g el e v e lr e d u c e st h ep o s i t i v ee ﬀect of incorporation on ﬁrm size by
about 5 percentage points.24
5C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper studies the decision to incorporate at the ﬁrm level. We analyze a model where
new ﬁrms decide whether to adopt corporate or non-corporate form. In particular, we
23Matching reduces the discrepancy between corporate and non-corporate ﬁrms with regard to all
observables (not only the eﬀective corporate tax) included in the selection model for incorporation.
24100 · [exp(5.397 − 9.570 · 0.5313 − 1) − exp(5.397 − 9.570 · 0.5213 − 1)],u s i n gc o e ﬃcients in Table 3.
32study two main arguments in favor of incorporation that are emphasized largely informally
in the literature: limited liability and access to capital. We propose an agency model
where ﬁrm transparancy improves corporate governance and thereby facilitates externally
ﬁnanced investment. The analytical part of the paper ﬁnds that better access to external
capital is an important beneﬁt of the corporate form when ﬁrms are ﬁnance constrained
while the eﬀect of limited liability on the incorporation decision is generally ambiguous.
Diﬀerential tax rates are also a crucial factor determining the incorporation decision. A
higher eﬀective corporate tax, measuring both ﬁrm level taxes and personal taxes on
distributed proﬁts, discriminates against incorporation while a higher personal income
tax rate on non-corporate ﬁrms encourages incorporation.
The empirical part exploits a large cross-sectional data-set of more than 540,000 ﬁrms
in 26 European countries to study the impact of corporate and personal income tax
instruments on the incorporation decision at the ﬁrm level. The data are supportive of
key hypotheses of our theoretical model. Most importantly, a higher eﬀective corporate
tax rate reduces a ﬁrm’s probability to incorporate while a higher personal income tax
rate (in particular, at high income levels) does the opposite. In particular, incorporation
leads to substantially larger ﬁrm size in terms of ﬁxed assets (investments), compared
to unincorporated ﬁrms with identical characteristics other than organizational form.
However, the size eﬀect of incorporation is compressed by a higher eﬀective corporate tax
rate (i.e., the combined tax burden between corporate taxes and the personal income tax
at the shareholder level).
Appendix
AM o d e l C l o s u r e
Incorporation imposes a diﬀerential ﬁxed cost k.A ﬁrm with success probability q of
early stage investment yields expected net present value of qπc − k if incorporated, and
33qπn if not. Note that πj is the surplus over the value of ﬁnancial and private assets, A
and (1 + β)H. Expected end of period utility of an E with a type q project is
uj (q)=qπj − kj +[ A +( 1+β)H + z], (A.1)
where kj = k if corporate and kn =0if not, and z is a lump-sum transfer from government.
After observing q0, agents choose organizational form. All q0 >qincorporate while
q0 <qremain as a sole proprietor and avoid the cost k, where the indiﬀerent type is
given by qπc − k = qπn.A s h a r e n =
R 1
q dG(q0) of ﬁr m si n c o r p o r a t e sb u to n l ysc =
R 1
q q0dG(q0) <nof all corporations and sn =
R q
0 q0dG(q0) < 1 − n of all non-corporate
ﬁrms survive to the mature stage. Due to business failure, sn + sc < 1.
Consider end of period welfare of entrepreneurs when taxes are refunded back to
them. The ﬁscal constraint yields a per capita transfer z = p[snTn + scTc].E n d o f
period utility is either un or uc, depending on organizational choice. Upon integration,
¯ u = snπn + scπc − kn+ A +( 1+β)H + z. Substituting πj from (2) and z yields
¯ u = A +( 1+β)H − kn+[ p(1 + ρ) − 1]
P
j sjIj − (1 − p)β
P
j sjhj. (A.2)
The ﬁrst two terms are end of period consumption value of wealth, the third term is early
stage investment from n start-ups, the fourth term is output minus expansion investment
in both sectors, and the last term is the loss in housing surplus due to business failure
where hn = H and hc ∈ {0,H} depending on whether incorporated ﬁrms use private
assets as a collateral or not.
B Data and Descriptive Statistics
We summarize the sample coverage across countries in Table A1 and descriptive statistics
of the independent variables considered in Table A2. We report means and standard
deviations along with the available numbers of observations not only for the whole sample
but also the sub-samples of incorporated and unincorporated ﬁrms. The means and
standard deviations of the country-level independent variables in the two sub-samples are
34frequency-weighted averages according to the numbers of incorporated and unincorporated
ﬁrms, respectively, across the included economies.
Tables A1 and A2
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37Table 1 - The impact of corporate and personal income taxation on the incorporation decision
Explanatory variables Probit 1 Probit 2 Probit 3
Effective shareholder corporate tax burden -3.103 ** -3.071 ** -1.745 ** -0.863 *
1.439 1.437 0.747 0.480
Top personal income tax rate 8.856 *** 8.406 *** 3.799 *** 4.713 ***
3.001 2.926 1.449 0.461
Creditor rights (0-3; higher index value means more rights) - - 0.362 *** 0.514 ***
- - 0.034 0.026
Accounting standards (0-100; a higher index value means higher standards) - - 0.056 *** 0.100 ***
- - 0.013 0.010
Anti-director rights (0-6; a higher index value means more rights) - - -0.405 *** -0.843 ***
- - 0.132 0.094
Log GDP per capita - - -0.516 -3.812 ***
- - 0.439 0.562
Costs of closing business (1-42; a higher index value means higher costs) - - - 0.028 ***
- - - 0.005
Costs of starting business (0-35.2; a higher index value means higher costs) - - - -0.092 ***
- - - 0.010
Observations 544'291 521'286 362'224 362'224
Fixed NACE 3-digit industry effects (127) no yes yes yes
Log-likelihood -124'645 -120'763 -77'257 -76'966
McFadden's pseudo-R
2 0.139 0.151 0.271 0.274
Probit 4
Notes: A constant is included in all models. The corresponding coefficient and standard error in Probit 1 are 2.618 and 1.467, respectively. Figures below coefficients are
standard errors which are robust to clustering at the country level and to heteroskedasticity. ***, **, * denote coefficients which are significantly different from zero at 1, 5, and
10 percent, respectively.Table 2 - Sensitivity analysis
Effective shareholder corporate tax burden -0.863 * -0.902 * -1.744 *** -1.076 ** -1.086 *** -0.742 *
0.480 0.482 0.549 0.549 0.416 0.420
Top personal income tax rate 4.713 *** 4.694 *** 3.179 *** 10.244 *** 2.870 *** 2.609 ***
0.461 0.466 0.382 0.595 0.649 0.664
Creditor rights (0-3; higher index value means more rights) 0.514 *** 0.515 *** 0.551 *** 1.121 *** 0.528 *** 0.487 ***
0.026 0.026 0.034 0.038 0.036 0.035
Accounting standards (0-100; a higher index value means higher standards) 0.100 *** 0.100 *** 0.023 *** 0.231 *** 0.094 *** 0.093 ***
0.010 0.011 0.004 0.009 0.007 0.007
Anti-director rights (0-6; a higher index value means more rights) -0.843 *** -0.842 *** -0.724 *** -1.905 *** -0.781 *** -0.761 ***
0.094 0.095 0.129 0.091 0.056 0.055
Log GDP per capita -3.812 *** -3.797 *** -1.250 ** -8.518 *** -3.697 *** -3.706 ***
0.562 0.566 0.551 0.748 0.540 0.574
Costs of closing business (1-42; a higher index value means higher costs) 0.028 *** 0.028 *** 0.022 *** 0.056 *** 0.032 *** 0.032 ***
0.005 0.005 0.007 0.008 0.004 0.004
Costs of starting business (0-35.2; a higher index value means higher costs) -0.092 *** -0.092 *** 0.003 -0.209 *** -0.085 *** -0.083 ***
0.010 0.011 0.009 0.013 0.013 0.013
Average cash flow/fixed assets in manufacturing of the country - 0.004 *** - - - -
- 0.001 - - - -
Observations 362'224 362'223 362'224 362'224 99'977 91'901
Fixed NACE 3-digit industry effects (127) yes yes yes yes yes yes
Log-likelihood -76'966 -76'963 -76'890 -76'901 -23'805 -21'168
McFadden's pseudo-R
2 0.274 0.274 0.275 0.275 0.268 0.246
Excl. firms>200 empl.
Alternative 4 Benchmark (Probit 4) Alternative 1
Probit 5 Probit 6 Explanatory variables
Notes: Figures below coefficients are standard errors which are robust to clustering at the country level and to heteroskedasticity. ***, **, * denote coefficients which are significantly different from zero at 1, 5, and 10
percent, respectively. - a) The model in Alternative 2 replaces the antidirector rights index of LaPorta, Lopez-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1999) by the alternative measure of Martynova and Renneboog (2008).
Logit Excl. firms>100 empl.
Alternative 3 Alternative 5 Alternative 2
a)Table 3 - Firm size (log fixed assets) and incorporation (using Probit 4 to estimate propensity scores)
Incorporation -0.760 *** -2.390 *** 0.408 * 5.397 ***
0.013 0.702 0.239 1.600
Incorporation   Effective shareholder corporate tax burden - 3.808 * - -9.570 ***




Notes: Figures below coefficients are standard errors which are robust to clustering at the country level and to heteroskedasticity. ***, * denote coefficients which
are significantly different from zero at 1 and 10 percent, respectively.
Treatment effect of the treatedTable A1 - Country coverage and firm distribution across countries
Country Firms Country Firms
Austria 1'012 Italy 100'312
Belgium 21'165 Latvia 804
Bulgaria 6'385 Lithuania 1'468
Croatia 3'378 Netherlands 17'848
Czech Republic 9'988 Poland 6'039
Denmark 8'949 Portugal 10'669
Estonia 5'950 Romania 56'061
Finland 11'110 Russian Federation 56'992
France 102'108 Slovak Republic 1'235
Germany 8'874 Slovenia 2'084
Greece 7'228 Spain 96'093
Hungary 5'169 Switzerland 15
Iceland 1'617 Ukraine 1'738Table A2 - Descriptive statistics
Obs. Mean Std.dev. Obs. Mean Std.dev. Obs. Mean Std.dev.
Effective shareholder corporate tax burden 544'291 0.424 0.138 40'748 0.503 0.107 503'543 0.418 0.138
Top personal income tax rate 544'291 0.514 0.069 40'748 0.520 0.041 503'543 0.514 0.071
Creditor rights (0-3; higher index value means more rights) 385'383 1.444 0.935 31'403 0.421 0.917 353'980 1.534 0.881
Accounting standards (0-100; a higher index value means higher standards) 385'383 63.952 6.058 31'403 67.624 3.335 353'980 63.626 6.137
Anti-director rights (0-6; a higher index value means more rights) 385'383 2.427 1.280 31'403 2.652 0.887 353'980 2.407 1.308
Log GDP per capita 544'291 9.351 1.010 40'748 9.657 0.864 503'543 9.326 1.017
Costs of closing business (1-42; a higher index value meanshigher costs) 542'674 11.079 5.584 40'740 10.407 5.261 501'934 11.133 5.606
Costs of starting business (0-35.2; a higher index value means higher costs) 542'674 11.141 6.745 40'740 5.996 7.320 501'934 11.558 6.521
Average cash flow/fixed assets in manufacturing of the country 542'193 30.829 1044.971 40'731 4.686 267.701 501'462 32.952 1083.872
Explanatory variable
Full sample Non-incorporated firms Incorporated firmsCESifo Working Paper Series 
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